Alexsandre Rondeli, president of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, talked to Georgian Journal about foreign policy of Georgian government, relations with Russia and perspective of de-occupation. We offer this conversation to our reader.
Q. There are arguments that the new government has changed country’s foreign policy, in order to back its efforts to warm up relations with Russia. What do you think about this issue?
A. Policy of Foreign relations is stable: it continues the policy that leads to the integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. But at the same time, it is looking for the new ways to improve relations with Russia. Word ‘normalization’ is often used in this case. But the question is, what is meant by normalization by the Georgian side and the Russian side. Besides, our potential and power are asymmetrical. So normalization means that Georgia should make concessions, but not Russia. Diplomacy is art of compromise: someone gains, someone loses.
Q. Georgia and Russia have their own interests in these negotiations. Whose interests will win?
A. Of course, our political interests are different. That’s why both sides avoid word de-occupation and talk about cultural and economical issues. Russia’s main interest is to forget about occupation and to show to the west that Russia and Georgia are talking peacefully. This will help retain new geopolitical layout for Russia and it will keep 20% of Georgian territory that is occupied. If we keep this way, Russia may assume that we agree on it. But in diplomacy we have to stand firm or ignore some moments to keep our priorities and interests alive. Our interest is de-occupation.
Q. Ways of working on de-occupation of old and new governments are different. How will new approach work?
A. Our efforts and intension to join NATO have big obstacles. NATO had to create special case for Georgia to admit the country with lost territories. Russia stopped Georgia’s aspiration in this direction. The war was unleashed for many reasons: one of them was Russian need for the symmetric answer to Kosovo’s recognition by the west and also to stop Georgia on its way to NATO. Besides, Russia made the west understand that there is a zone that shouldn’t be touched. And Russia achieved its aim: it intimidated the west and Georgia and it strengthened its positions in the South Caucasus. There is a psychological moment. Georgia is one of the most refractory republics in regard to Russia. It is a paradox, but this stubborn country is the weakest because it has suffered ethnic conflicts and civil wars.
Q. What danger does Georgia pose to Russia with its strive for Euro-Atlantic structures?
A. Russian political and military elite views the post-Soviet space as its territory. Traditionally, Russian so called strategic doctrine implies wider and deeper border to make its military power stronger. It was Russian way of thinking in the times of the Soviet Union and it remains that way till today - in the epoch of ballistic rackets, computer and supersonic aircraft it manages to have the 19th century way of thinking. This is a fact, regardless of whatever we call it or how we estimate it. They create an image of enemy and explain why quality of living is so low in their country; because they bear permanent defense expenses, they say. But quite a big part of population already sees that most of the world needs peace and there is no danger of war and conflict. Political and military leaders think differently. Georgia’s strive for the west is unacceptable, because other post-Soviet countries and Russians too will follow the suit.
Q. But some post-Soviet countries are already members of NATO and European Union, are not they?
A. Russia doesn’t consider Baltic countries as its part. They are European countries. Europeanism ends where Catholicism and Protestantism end. Who is European? According to the western way of thinking, countries that went through Renaissance, reformation, enlightenment and age of revolutions are European. We have the chance and have to wait for our moment. It’s the tougher way than the way that the Baltic countries have passed.